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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is likely no area of employment law more ancient than the law of 
post-employment competition.  The so-called “rule of reason” that 
undergirds contemporary noncompete doctrine dates to the early 1700s,1 and 
 
 Visiting Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Chauncy Wilson Memorial 
Research Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law; L.L.M., Temple Law 
School; J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A. Rutgers University. Thank you to colleagues Alan 
Hyde, Orly Lobel, Evan Starr, Daniel Sokol, and Steven Wilborn for valuable feedback and 
Denver Law students Jessica Chao, Kellie Jenkins, and Becca Voorhees for outstanding 
research assistance.  Inspiration and ideas for this article came in part from the 2019 
Conference on the Changing Nature of Work and Workplaces at Syracuse University, 
Whitman School of Management.  Thank you to the organizers and all presenters and 
participants.  All errors are my own. 
 1  See Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).  The first recorded instances 
of the use of employee noncompetition agreements date to the fifteenth and sixteenth century, 
at which time they were considered per se void as against public policy.  See Harlan M. Blake, 
Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631–32 (1960) (summarizing 
early history of noncompete law); Mark A. Glick et al., The Law and Economics of Covenants: 
A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 360–68 (2002) (same).  By contrast the 
rule of employment at will—the enduring, if controversial, presumption of the parties’ right 
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until recently it has been relatively stagnant.2  At the dawn of the millennium, 
the law of noncompetes appeared largely as it did in the 18th century: almost 
every state, with the notable exception of California,3 permitted validly 
formed noncompetes, provided they were tied to a protectible business 
interest of the employer and reasonable in scope.4 
But times are changing.  In the last decade, there has been a surge in 
public initiatives targeting employers’ use and enforcement of restraints 
against employee competition—what I refer to as the “new enforcement 
regime.”  These have come at all levels of government and in a variety of 
 
to freely terminate their relationship that undergirds all of American employment law—came 
into being a full century and a half later.  See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the 
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.118, 125–29 (1976) (providing an historical 
context and critical perspective on the rise of employment at will doctrine). 
 2  By way of comparison, the near two centuries that have elapsed since the formal 
articulation of the at-will rule have witnessed a series of pendulum swings in which the courts 
and legislatures have alternately deferred to and dialed back on employers’ right to terminate 
workers at their discretion.  This phenomenon is often described as a movement between 
contract and status, the former embracing freedom of contract principles and deferring to the 
private “choices” of the parties with respect to the terms of employment, and the latter 
deeming employment a state-sanctioned status relationship subject to publicly imposed limits 
and protections.  For a discussion of these concepts, see Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, 
Employment as Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 468–69 (2009); Jay M. Feinman, 
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 124–25 (1976).   
 3  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 
2020 Reg. Sess.).  For historical background on California’s peculiar law, which dates to the 
late 1800s, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 
614–19 (1999).  Two other states have near identical statutory bans dating to the same period: 
North Dakota and Oklahoma.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (West, Westlaw through 
legislation effective Jan. 1, 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West, Westlaw through 
First Regular Session of the 57th Legislature (2019)).  North Dakota has consistently banned 
the use of noncompetes, but has received little to no scholarly attention, likely owing to the 
modest size of its economy.  By contrast, for decades courts in Oklahoma construed that 
state’s statute as permitting restraints deemed reasonable at common law despite its plain 
language.  See Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. of America, 465 P.2d 448 
(Okla. 1970).  Recently, a combination of statutory amendments and judicial decisions 
effectively restored the original meaning of the statute, making Oklahoma the third state to 
ban noncompetes and the first to do since the emergence of the new enforcement regime.  See 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West, Westlaw through First Regular Session of the 57th 
Legislature (2019)); see generally Teresa L. Green, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive 
Covenants in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 449 (2015); infra Part II.B.2.  
 4  See, e.g., WI. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020); TEX. BUS & COM. CODE § 15.50 (2020); 
Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396–97 (Ill. 2011) (holding that a 
noncompete is reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for a legitimate business 
interest; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee; and (3) is not injurious to the 
public); Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d  572, 576–77 (Mass. 2004) (holding 
that a noncompete is enforceable “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business 
interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest”); see 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981); infra Part II.A.   
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forms, including new legislation, regulatory initiatives, targeted litigation, 
and enforcement programs.5  With some exceptions, their aim is to restrict 
employers’ already limited ability to prevent post-employment competition,6 
a move consistent with a growing body of academic literature asserting that 
such restraints against competition are harmful to employees and the 
economy.7 
It is therefore a fitting moment to reexamine the law and scholarship of 
employee competition.  It is also a fitting time to reconsider the work of one 
particular scholar whose contributions to the employment law field are 
abundant and diverse.8  Professor Charles Sullivan, over the course of a 
prolific forty-year career, periodically waded into the “vast sea” of 
 
 5  See infra Part II. 
 6  For instance, a number of states have passed legislation categorically prohibiting the 
use of noncompetes against workers earning below a threshold income.  See, e.g., 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 90/10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-629); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
26 § 599-A (West, Westlaw through Chapter 560 of the 2019 Second Regular Session of the 
129th Legislature); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West, Westlaw through all 
legislation from the 2019 Regular Session of the General Assembly); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 275:70-a (West, Westlaw through Chapter 4 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.).  These and additional 
limitations will be discussed infra Part II.  
 7  A fair amount of legal scholarship, including Sullivan’s, has argued for more limited 
enforcement of noncompetes based on the risk of employer overreach leading to inefficient 
and/or unfair results between the individual employer and employee.  See, e.g., Rachel S. 
Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the 
Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163 
(2001) [hereinafter Bargaining for Loyalty]; Blake, supra note 1; Cynthia Estlund, Between 
Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form 
of Employment Law, 155 PENN. L. REV. 2 (2006); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: 
Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 721 (2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of 
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 1127 (2009) [hereinafter Puzzling Persistence]. A second research stream in legal 
scholarship has focused on the economic benefits of employee mobility and the adverse 
effects of human capital controls on the overall economy.  See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING 
IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 
(2003); ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, 
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013); Gilson, supra note 3, at 577–80.  As will be discussed, a 
robust body of research in the fields of economics and business now provides empirical 
support for these critiques. See infra Part II. 
 8  Professor Sullivan is known perhaps principally for his extensive work in 
antidiscrimination law.  For recent examples, see, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying 
Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly 
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011); Charles A. 
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 191 (2009). However, Professor Sullivan has written on diverse topics ranging from 
artificial intelligence, see Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018), to 
asterisk footnotes, see Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. 
L. J. 1093 (2005).   
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employee-competition law.9  Of particular note are two Articles—one 
penned in the late 1970s,10 the other, over thirty years later11—that are not 
only relevant to the current conversation, but eerily prescient.12  In them, he 
articulates two risks of the unfettered use of noncompetes: the likelihood that 
employers will impose illegally broad restraints on unassuming employees;13 
and the possibility that even modestly drafted noncompetes, taken in the 
aggregate, will adversely affect economic competition.14  Both suppositions 
have since been borne out by emerging empirical data that is playing an 
important role in noncompete reform efforts.15 
This Article offers a 2020 perspective on a decade of on-the-ground 
reform efforts and ground-breaking empirical research.  The new 
enforcement regime appears to be heeding the calls of an emerging literature 
that is toppling fundamental assumptions about the use of noncompetes and 
the effectiveness of court-imposed limits on their enforcement.  My claim, 
however, is that it does not go far enough in deterring employer overreach in 
drafting and requesting noncompetes.  While the new regime will likely 
succeed in reigning in particular employer abuses—by imposing, for 
instance, what I will refer to as “vulnerable worker bans”—more aggressive 
reforms are needed to protect the mobility of all employees and to realize the 
economic benefits of a so-called “high velocity” labor market.16 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys the historical and 
emerging law of employee noncompetition.  It describes a budding 
enforcement regime with the potential to upend basic enforcement rules and 
status quo employer practices.  Part III considers both the impetus and 
justification for these policy developments, connecting Professor Sullivan’s 
 
 9  See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Clev. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio 1952) 
(describing the common law of noncompete enforcement as “a sea—vast and vacillating, 
overlapping and bewildering” out of which “[o]ne can fish . . . any kind of strange support for 
anything”). 
 10  Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the “Neglected Stepchild”: Antitrust Treatment of 
Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621 (1977) [hereinafter Neglected 
Stepchild]. 
 11  The Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7. 
 12  Nor are these Sullivan’s sole contributions to this field.  Also relevant are his works 
on “garden leave,” or pay-to-sit-out clauses, and employee loyalty.  See Charles A. Sullivan, 
Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via “Garden Leave”, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 293 (2016) [hereinafter Tending the Garden]; Charles A Sullivan, Mastering the 
Faithless Servant: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 777 (2011).  For purposes of this paper, I limit my discussion to the other two. 
 13  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1150–51. 
 14  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 637. 
 15  See infra Part III 
 16  ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A 
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003). 
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past work to a wave of empirical scholarship that seemingly validates long-
held fears about the adverse economic effects of noncompete agreements and 
the law’s inability to police opportunistic employer behavior.  Part IV 
speculates on what the new enforcement regime means for employee 
mobility.  It argues that in order for the new enforcement regime to 
meaningfully alter current practices, state legislation must go further in three 
ways.  New laws must (1) ensure that workers receive initial notice of and 
maintain ongoing access to information about their rights; (2) categorically 
void agreements that reflect employer overreach, and (3) create pathways for 
employees to challenge and remedy unlawful noncompete practices at all 
stages of employment. 
II.  NONCOMPETITION LAW, THEN AND NOW 
The regulation of employee mobility is a delicate matter.  On one hand, 
the law must protect employers’ investments in both information and human 
capital in order to incentivize research and development.17  At the same time, 
the law cannot allow employers to stymie fair competition or to impede the 
free mobility of labor.18  At the cross-section of these competing policies is 
the question of the contractual enforceability of noncompete agreements that 
limit employees’ prospects for future employment.  This section examines 
noncompete law historically and from the vantage point of today, describing 
a viral reform movement that, over the last five years, has sought to ban 
noncompetes in particular populations and limit their use in the labor market 
overall.  This movement is giving way to a new enforcement regime far less 
hospitable to noncompetes among states that have long condoned their use. 
A.  The Predictably Unpredictable Common Law 
Compared to other restrictive covenants, noncompetes are of particular 
concern because they impose outright limits on employees’ ability to engage 
in competitive work.19  They have the potential to profoundly impede 
 
 17  See generally Blake, supra note 1, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer, 
postemployment restraints are regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing 
unscrupulous competitors or employees from appropriating valuable trade information and 
customer relationships for their own benefit.”).  Professor Harlan Blake’s seminal article, 
although written sixty years ago, still serves as an eloquent and insightful exposition of the 
competing policies underlying noncompete law, and I rely on it throughout this section and 
the Article.  
 18  See id. (“[Postemployment] restraints also diminish competition by intimidating 
potential competitors and by slowing down the dissemination of ideas, processes, and 
methods.  They unfairly weaken the individual employee’s bargaining position vis-à-vis his 
employer and, from the social point of view, clog the market’s channeling of manpower to 
employments in which its productivity is greatest.”). 
 19  Other contractual instruments like non-solicitation and non-disclosure agreements, by 
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individual workers’ access to economic opportunity, effectively indenturing 
them to a particular employer.  Thus, noncompetes pose an especially high 
risk of economic harm to the individual employees who sign them, as well 
as the broader harms to society that flow from any private agreement in 
restraint of trade. 
The law has historically attempted to contain both risks by imposing a 
two-part “rule of reason.”20  In every state that permits noncompetes, 
employers must first justify their use of the instrument by demonstrating an 
interest at stake beyond the mere desire to avoid ordinary competition or 
retain the individual employee.21  The way that interest is defined varies 
somewhat across states, but generally the law requires that the employee 
have access either to trade secrets, confidential information, or customer 
 
contrast, impose much narrower restraints on employees.  The former prohibit employees 
from contacting co-workers or past clients; the latter from disclosing or relying on proprietary 
information.  The fact that contractual vehicles for protecting employer interests exist short 
of an outright restraint on employee competition casts further doubt on the justifications for 
allowing noncompetes given their harsh effects on employees.  New legislation in 
Massachusetts recognizes this point, making the potential effectiveness of less onerous 
restraints a consideration in determining the reasonableness of a noncompete.  See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24L(b)(iii) (West 2020) (“A noncompetition agreement may be 
presumed necessary where the legitimate business interest cannot be adequately protected 
through an alternative restrictive covenant, including but not limited to a non-solicitation 
agreement or a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”).  For the most part, however, 
states have categorized all restrictive covenants imposed on employees as subject to the basic 
rule of reason developed in the noncompete context.  See, e.g,W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn 
Div. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1999) (“[A nonsolicitation agreement] contained 
in an employment contract is considered to be in partial restraint of trade and will be upheld 
if the restrain imposed is not unreasonable . .”); Aon Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Fin. 
Benefits, Inc., 748 N.W.2d 626, 653 (Neb. 2008) (determining the enforceability of a 
nonsolicitation agreement by considering whether the restriction is “(1) reasonable in the 
sense that it is not injurious to the public, (2) not greater than is reasonably necessary to protect 
the employer in some legitimate interest, and (3) not unduly harsh and oppressive on the 
employee.”); Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 512, 528 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“A nonsolicitation clause is only valid if reasonably related to the 
employer’s interest in protecting customer relations that its employees developed while 
working for the employer.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 20  I have described the applicable legal framework in more detail elsewhere, as have 
others.  See generally Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1173−80 (2001); Estlund, supra 
note 7, at 393-95; Glick, supra note 1, at 370–73.  For purposes of this Article, therefore, I 
offer a brief summary, relying on these and other sources. 
 21  See, e.g., Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that “avoidance of competition is not a legitimate business interest” 
in finding geographically broad physician noncompete unenforceable); Hasty v. Rent-A-
Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) (“[A]ny competition by a former employee 
may well injure the business of the employer.  An employer, however, cannot by contract 
restrain ordinary competition.”); Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996) (“[I]t is well 
settled that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by a noncompetition covenant.  
If the sole purpose is to avoid ordinary competition, it is unreasonable and unenforceable.”).  
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relationships.22  Once the employer meets this threshold showing, it must 
additionally demonstrate that the scope of the restraint is reasonable in 
relation to those interests and not unduly harmful to the employee.23 
This body of common law has long had a statutory overlay.  Over the 
course of the twentieth century about half the states enacted some form of 
noncompete legislation.  For the most part, however, those statutes did not 
substantially change the underlying law.  Some targeted specific professions, 
such as physicians or radio broadcasters.24  Others made particular tweaks, 
such as expanding or more precisely delineating the circumstances under 
which an employer could meet the threshold requirement of an underlying 
interest.25  Yet, for the most part, these statutes reaffirmed the two-part rule 
of reason.  Some codified it outright.26  Others took a seemingly more 
comprehensive or idiosyncratic approach, only to later be interpreted by 
court decisions reasserting the relevance of the historical rule.27  In the end, 
 
 22  See Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1176.  
 23  See Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1178; Glick, supra note 
1, at 371–73.  Some articulations of the rule also reference potential harm to the public, see 
generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981) (declaring noncompete 
unenforceable where “the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and 
the likely injury to the public”), but as discussed, infra, courts generally omit any direct 
application of that portion of the rule. See infra Part III.A. 
 24  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14p (West 2020); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10 
(2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 186 (2018); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 202-k (McKinney 2018); 
5 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37-33 (West 2020); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 
2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West 2020). 
 25  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b)(5) (2020) (recognizing “extraordinary or 
specialized training” as a basis for enforcing a noncompete); ALA. CODE § 8-1-191 (2020) 
(recognizing “[s]pecialized and unique training involving substantial business expenditure” 
as a protectable business interest justifying enforcement of restrictive covenants); cf. C.R.S.A. 
§8-2-113(2)(c) (2019) (sanctioning the use of training repayment contracts with employees 
who depart within two years of employment).  
 26  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 44-2701 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (2018); WIS. 
STAT. § 103.465 (2018). 
 27  As an extreme example, in the 1980s, courts in Oklahoma ruled that the state’s 
century-old noncompete statute, which on its face declared all restraints of trade void, applied 
only to agreements deemed unreasonable at common law.  See infra, Part II.B.2; see also 
Technicolor Inc. v Traeger, 551 P. 2d 163, 170 (Haw. 1976) (finding that Hawaii statute 
seemingly limiting lawful employee noncompetes to the protection of trade secrets “was not 
meant to be exclusive” permitting a court to analyze “all restrictive convenants. . . not listed 
as ‘per se  violations’ and determine their validity” under the rule of reason). A more subtle 
example is Colorado.  That state’s statute, confines enforceable restraints of trade to situations 
involving trade secrets or “managerial and executive” employees.  C.R.S.A. §8-2-113 (2019).  
Yet some cases read the statutory exceptions in ways that arguably expand the  bases for a 
noncompete to be more in accordance with traditional common law.  For instance, while the 
Colorado statute does not create an exception for agreements protecting customer goodwill, 
courts have read the trade secret provision to permit noncompetes that effectively serve that 
purpose.  See, e.g., Great Am. Opportunities, Inc. v. Kent, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1134–35(D. 
Co. 2018) (finding question of fact existed as to whether employer’s customer lists and 
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noncompete law remained at the tail end of the millennium what it had 
always been—a common law body of doctrine largely consistent across 
those jurisdictions that are willing to enforce them.28 
That is not to say that application of the law has been clear or 
consistent.29  Courts apply the rule of reason case-by-case, usually in the 
context of a preliminary injunction hearing.  The legal inquiry is highly fact-
specific, and the sentiments of judges toward the instruments varies.  Much 
ink has been spilt attempting to rank jurisdictions in terms or their support 
for or aversion to enforcement,30 and the inability to predict outcomes is a 
constant refrain.31  Adding to the uncertainty, during the mid-twentieth 
century, courts in some states began to reform overbroad agreements that 
would otherwise fail the rule of reason.32 The evolution of this practice has 
deepened the variation between jurisdictions,33 contributing to strategic 
 
account information constituted trade secrets justifying enforcement of otherwise invalid 
noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses against sales representative who solicited 
business from former  clients).  In addition, while the statute refers exclusively to “trade 
secrets,” decisions sometimes refer to the legitimacy of restraints protecting “confidential 
information.”  See, e.g., Haggard v. Spine, No. 09-cv-00721-CMA-KMT, 2009 WL 1655030, 
at *5–6 (D. Colo. June 12, 2009); see generally Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 
1182−89 (exploring the distinction between trade secret and confidential information).  The 
upshot is that Colorado law is considerably more tolerant of noncompetes than one might 
suppose from reading its statute. 
 28  See Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985) (asserting as of the mid-1980s that the rule of reason “has 
survived virtually unchanged to the present day”). 
 29  For nearly seventy-five years, scholars and courts alike have pointed to the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s vivid description of the jurisprudence:  “[It is] a sea—vast and vacillating, 
overlapping and bewildering” out of which “[o]ne can fish . . . any kind of strange support for 
anything.” Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio 
1952) 
 30  See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative 
Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility 
Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751 (2011); Evan Starr, Consider This: Firm-Sponsored Training 
and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 783 (2019).  For 
a discussion and assessment of the various indexes of state laws, see generally J.J. Prescott, 
Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 
Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. STATE L. REV. 369, 458–59 (2016).  
 31  See Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1243 (describing noncompetes as 
“placeholders guaranteeing the employer a judicially crafted remedy”); Orly Lobel, 
Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
869 (2016) [hereinafter Enforceability TBD] (discussing the costs of uncertainty in 
noncompete enforcement to the intellectual property regime). 
 32  See, e.g., Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 196 N.E. 856, 858 (Mass. 1935); Solari 
Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53 (NJ 1970); Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 
N.W.2d 585, 592 (Wisc. 1955). 
 33  This practice appears to have begun with courts merely “blue penciling” – or striking 
out—discrete clause, but has evolved into a practice of fully rewriting the overbroad restraint. 
See, e.g., Fullerton, 70 N.W.2d 585 at 552 (“[W]e do not see why the basic reason for 
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behavior on the part of employers and their counsel.34  These differences, 
however, are a matter of application rather than a reflection of the law itself.  
In those jurisdictions that enforce them, the governing principles and 
doctrinal rules were, until recently, largely the same, and the question of the 
legality of noncompetes was considered settled law. 
B.  Reform Gone Viral 
This laconic landscape recently has given way to a viral reform 
movement that is fast displacing the status quo.  Since 2015, there have been 
dozens of state legislative initiatives, at least three bills introduced in 
Congress, and a host of regulatory and enforcement efforts at both the state 
and federal levels targeting employee noncompetes and other agreements 
that limit mobility.  This section provides an overview of some of these 
developments, focusing on three types of reform efforts: what I refer to as 
“vulnerable worker bans” that prohibit noncompetes with low-wage, low-
skilled workers; “California-style bans” that seek to void all forms of 
employee noncompetes; and “middle way” statutes that impose select 
procedural requirements and substantive limitations on how, where, and 
under what conditions noncompetes may be imposed and enforced. 
1.  Protecting the Vulnerable 
The most successful reform initiative thus far has been a wide-spread 
effort to ban the predatory use of noncompetes with vulnerable workers—
 
[enforcing] a contract after removing terms which are literally divisible should not also exist 
in the case of indivisible promise”); see generally Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, 
Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable 
Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 245–51 (2007) 
(describing the different jurisdictional approaches to unreasonable non-compete agreements, 
including “voiding the agreement, using the ‘Blue Pencil’ doctrine to eliminate an 
unreasonable term, and using the ‘Blue Pencil’ doctrine to eliminate an unreasonable term 
and replace it with a reasonable term.”). In a handful of states, legislation subsequently 
overruled or clarified the practice of judicial modification, adding another dimension to the 
differences between states on this critical point. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020). 
I will return to the need for further legislation limiting judicial modification, infra Part IV. 
 34  See e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying 
Georgia law and voiding noncompete despite its Ohio choice-of-law provision in declaratory 
judgment suit where employee had never worked in Ohio and had relocated to Georgia for 
position with new employer at time of filing); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional 
Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the 
Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1385–86 (2008) (describing how 
companies seek to leverage the pro-noncompete stance of particular jurisdictions through 
choice-of-law agreements); Viva Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 939, 943 (2012) (arguing for uniform non-enforcement rule to avoid conflict of laws and 
other “state-to-state problems” resulting from jurisdictional differences in noncompete 
enforcement). 
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those who are either low-wage, low-skilled or both.  An employer’s need for 
a noncompete in such cases is questionable; such workers are unlikely to 
have access to the type of information or customer relationships that would 
provide a competitive advantage post-employment.35  Vulnerable workers 
are also less likely than their better-paid, higher-skilled counterparts to 
comprehend the legal significance of a noncompete or object to its 
imposition as a condition of employment.  The use of noncompetes in such 
situations raises suspicions of unfair dealing. 
Over a dozen states have entertained statutory bans on the imposition 
of noncompetes on vulnerable workers—defined by reference to a particular 
economic indicator or to other employment laws.36  These “vulnerable 
worker bans,” as I refer to them, have come both in the form of stand-alone 
legislation or in conjunction with other proposed reforms.  At least seven 
such initiatives have passed and approximately half a dozen are pending or 
were recently considered.37  Similar moves have been made at the federal 
level.  In 2015, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced the 
Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (“MOVE”) Act, which 
would have banned noncompetes with employees earning below the federal 
 
 35  Indeed, many such agreements would likely be held unenforceable under the rule of 
reason were they to be pursued in court.  As will be discussed, a core contribution of Professor 
Sullivan’s work, and one impetus behind efforts to ban noncompetes in vulnerable 
populations, is the recognition that such agreements constrain those who sign them 
irrespective of their legality, an issue that may never be litigated.  See Puzzling Persistence, 
supra note 711, at 1137–39 (explaining why an employee would more likely comply with an 
overbroad noncompete than risk being sued); Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23 
(describing litigated noncompete cases as the “proverbial iceberg’s tip”); infra Part III.B. 
 36  Many of these efforts use the federal or state minimum wage as a reference.  See, e.g., 
ILL. COMP. STAT ch. 820 § 90/5 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2020).  Some 
track the employee’s exempt or non-exempt status under the Fair Labor Standards Act or its 
state law equivalent. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(c)(i) (West 2020).  
Others set out threshold income levels. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26 § 599-A (2019) 
(400% of the federal poverty level); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2020) 
($15/hour and $31,200 annually); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1)(d) (West 2016) (U.S. 
Census Bureau’s median family income for family of four); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-59-2(7) 
(2020) (250% of the federal poverty level for individuals); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 
49.62.020(1)(b) (West 2020) (salary of $100,000 per year, to be adjusted annually).  
 37  Legislation has passed and/or gone into effect in Illinois, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/10 
(2018), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A (2020), Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. 
& EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2020), Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L (West 
2020), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:70-a (2020), Rhode Island, 28 R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 28-59-3 (2020), and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020 (West 2020).  
Bills are pending or were recently considered in Connecticut, H.B. 6913, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 
Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019), Hawaii, H.B. 1059, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2019), Indiana, S.B. 
348, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019), New Jersey, S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. 
Sess. (N.J. 2018), New York, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), 
Pennsylvania, H.B. 563, 2019 Leg., 203rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019), and Virginia, S.B. 1387, 
2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018).  
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or applicable state minimum wage.38  More recently, Senator Marco Rubio 
introduced the Freedom to Compete Act, which would amend the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to preclude the use of noncompetes with non-exempt 
employees subject to minimum wage and overtime requirements.39 
In addition to these legislative efforts, a number of regulatory programs 
seeking to protect the mobility of vulnerable employees are also underway.  
In early 2018, the Washington State Attorney General’s Office spearheaded 
a worker protection initiative that aims to eradicate the use of “no poach” 
clauses in franchise contracts.  “No poach” clauses differ from noncompetes 
in that they are found in contracts between business entities, but their effect 
is similar: The corporate franchisor requires each individual franchisee, as a 
condition of operating, not to employ workers previously employed by 
another franchisee, resulting in a de facto bar against employee movement 
between corporate locations.40  These franchise employees frequently work 
low-skill service jobs such as food preparation, cash register operation, clean 
up, and related service and retail tasks for minimum or near-minimum 
wage.41 
 
 38  The “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015).  See generally Lydia DePillis, Can 
the Senate Stop Low-Wage Employers from Tying up Workers with Non-competes?, WASH. 
POST (June 2, 2015, 3:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/0 
2/can-the-senate-stop-low-wage-employers-from-tying-up-their-workers-with-non-compete 
s/.  
 39  Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019).  See generally Clifford R. Atlas, 
Erik J. Winton & Colin A. Thakkar, U.S. Senator Reignites Federal Non-Compete Reform 
Efforts with Bill Aimed at Protecting Low-Wage Employees, NAT’L L. R. (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-senator-reignites-federal-non-compete-reform-
efforts-bill-aimed-protecting-low.  This bill is currently in the Committee on Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship. CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/124/all-info (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).  Also pending is a more recent bill sponsored by 
Senator Murphy and Senator Young that would ban all employee noncompetes, limiting such 
restraints to situations involving the sale or disillusion of business entities.  See Workforce 
Mobility Act of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019); Amanda Jaret & Sandeep Vaheesan, Non-
Compete Clauses Are Suffocating American Workers, TIME (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://time.com/5753078/non-compete-clauses-american-workers/; infra Part II.B.2. 
 40  For instance, prior to settling with the AG’s Office, Jimmy John’s standard franchise 
contract provided that “Franchisee shall not. . .[e]mploy or seek to employ any person who is 
at that time employed by Franchisor or by any Affiliate of Franchisor, or by any other 
franchisee of Franchisor, or otherwise directly or indirectly induce or seek to induce such 
person to leave his or her employment thereat.” Compl. for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and 
Other Relief at 4, State of Wash. v. Jersey Mike Franchise Sys. et. al., No. 1802025822-7 
(Wash. King Cty. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2018). 
 41  Indeed, the Washington AG’s efforts gained popular attention when the media 
reported on the use of no poach clauses by the Jimmy John’s sandwich franchise which 
eliminated any intra-franchise opportunities for the low-wage workers who assemble its 
sandwiches.  See Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete 
Clause, N. Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/ 
when-the-guy-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html; Ben Rooney, Jimmy 
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The Washington State Attorney General’s office, operating under its 
antitrust authority and in conjunction with other states’ offices, has 
investigated and reached settlements with over one hundred and fifty 
national corporate chains— primarily in the fast food industry, but also with 
an expanding array of service and retail operators, including gyms, hotels, 
home cleaners, shippers, and tax preparers.42  The negotiated consent 
agreements provide that the corporate franchisor will cease requiring “no 
poach” clauses in its franchise contracts and refrain from enforcing them in 
any existing contract.  In at least one instance, the Office initiated litigation 
against a franchisor that initially declined to settle,43 and several class-action 
suits have been brought on behalf of employees adversely affected by the 
clauses.44 
 
John’s Under Fire for Worker Contracts, CNN: MONEY (Oct. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2014/10/22/news/jimmy-johns-non-compete/index.html.  No-poach 
agreements, however, are not limited to franchise contracts nor do they only affect low wage 
workers.  In the late 2000s the Department of Justice filed suit and ultimately achieved 
settlement with several iconic Silicon Valley technology companies, including Google, 
Apple, Adobe, and Intuit, that had informally agreed not to hire each others’ employees.  See 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies 
to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), 
https://www.ustice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-compani 
es-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee. More recently, then-California Attorney General 
Kamala Harris filed suit against eBay for entering into “handshake” agreement with Intuit not 
to hire or recruit each other’s employees.  See Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, Cal. Att’y 
Gen., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Files Lawsuit against eBay for Anticompetitive 
Hiring Agreement (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-
general-kamala-d-harris-files-lawsuit-against-ebay-anticompetitive. Such “gentleman’s 
agreements” among key industry players are especially notorious given California’s robust 
stance against agreements in restraints of trade.  See generally Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer 
Bonds: How Employers Fix The Talent Market, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 668–70 (2020) 
[hereinafter Gentlemen Prefer Bonds] (discussing the Google litigation and settlement and the 
DOJ’s investigation of other “horizontal” collusions limiting worker mobility).  
 42  See Press Release, Bob Ferguson, Wash. Att’y Gen., AAG to Testify to Congress as 
AG Ferguson’s Anti-No-Poach Initiative Reaches 155 Corporate Chains (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/aag-testify-congress-ag-ferguson-s-anti-no-
poach-initiative-reaches-155-corporate; see generally Gentleman Prefer Bonds, supra note 
40 (discussing these  and related efforts). 
 43  Attorney General Ferguson filed suit against Jersey Mike’s for violation of antitrust 
provisions in Washington’s Consumer Protection Act after the company refused to remove 
no-poach clauses from their existing franchise contracts.  See Press Release, Bob Ferguson, 
Wash. Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson Announces Major Milestones in Initiative to Eliminate No-
Poach Clauses Nationwide, Files Lawsuit Against Jersey Mikes (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-announces-major-milestones-
initiative-eliminate-no-poach-clauses.  The suit subsequently settled. 
 44  See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 2, Turner v. McDonald’s USA, No. 1:19-cv-
05524 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2019); Class Action Complaint at 1, Griffith v. H&R Block, Inc., 
No. 4:19-cv-00470-ODS (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2018); Plaintiff’s Antitrust Class Action 
Complaint at 1, Rice v. Arby’s Franchisor, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00131-NRN (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 
2019); Class Action Complaint at 1, Fuentes v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., No. 18-5174 (E.D. Pa. 
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Similar work has been underway, albeit with less national attention, to 
address the direct use of noncompetes with employees.  The New York and 
Illinois Attorneys General’s Offices, for instance, have been investigating 
the use of unreasonable noncompetes, broadly defined, based on employee 
complaints.  Like the Washington Attorney General’s Office, they have 
proceeded primarily through their investigative power, achieving settlements 
with several large employers45 and in some cases, initiating litigation.46  The 
New York initiative includes a direct information campaign targeting 
individual employees.  The Office has disseminated an easy-to-understand 
question and answer sheet explaining workers’ rights and options before and 
after signing a noncompete and urging workers to report abusive 
agreements.47 
In sum, there is a developing consensus in favor of outright bans against 
employers’ use of noncompetes with certain vulnerable populations.  The 
movement is playing out primarily at the state level through the efforts of 
legislatures and chief law enforcement offices, although there is interest at 
the federal level as well.48  These efforts, while limited in scope, have been 
 
Nov. 29, 2018); Class Action Complaint at 1, Houston v. Papa Johns Int’l, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-
825-JHM (W.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2018); see generally Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41 
(discussing such litigation).  
 45  See New York State, Office of the Attorney General, Non-Compete Agreements in 
New York State: Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2018),  https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/fil 
es/non-competes.pdf; see also Aruna Viswanatha, Sandwich Chain Jimmy John’s to Drop 
Noncompete Clauses from Hiring Packets, THE WALL STREET J. (June 21, 2016, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sandwich-chain-jimmy-johns-to-drop-noncompete-clauses-
from-hiring-packets-1466557202; Elliot Brown, WeWork Reaches Settlement on Noncompete 
Pacts, THE WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ar 
ticles/wework-reaches-settlement-on-noncompete-pacts-1537304008.  
 46  See, e.g.,  People of Ill. v. Check Into Cash of Ill., LLC, No. 2017-CH-14224 (Cook 
County Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 25, 2017); People of Ill. v. Jimmy John’s Enters., LLC, No. 2016-
CH-07746 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed June 8, 2016); see generally State of Illinois, Office 
of the Attorney General, Overuse of Non-Competition Agreements: Understanding How They 
Are Used, Who They Harm, and What State Attorneys General Can Do to Protect the Public 
Interest (June 13, 2018),  https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/webpage_materi 
als_papers_madigan_flanagan_june_13_2018.pdf. 
 47  See New York State, supra note 45.  More recently the Washington AG’s Office 
expanded its Worker Protection Initiative to similarly consider abusive noncompete 
practicing, filing litigation and ultimately achieving a settlement with a coffee shop requiring 
such agreements of its barristas.  See Press Release, Bob Ferguson, Wash. Att’y Gen., 
Attorney General Bob Ferguson Stops King County Coffee Shop’s Practice Requiring 
Baristas To Sign Unfair Non-Compete Agreements (Oct. 29, 2019) https://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
news/news-releases/attorney-general-bob-ferguson-stops-king-county-coffee-shop-s-practic 
e-requiring. 
 48  For instance, Congress received testimony from the Washington Attorney General’s 
Office regarding its anti-no poach and expanded non-compete initiative at a hearing on Labor 
Market Competition held late last year.  See U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing: Antitrust 
and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets available at 
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successful in prohibiting some of the most abusive uses of noncompetes. 
2.  Chasing California 
In contrast to these narrowly targeted efforts, a handful of reformers 
have set their sights higher.  At the federal level, Senator Chris Murphy last 
year introduced legislation seeking a federal California-style ban on 
noncompetes.49  Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission is considering a 
petition, supported by various scholars and interest groups, calling on the 
agency to use its rulemaking authority to declare employee noncompetes an 
unfair method of competition.50 
At the state level, in 2015, Hawaii adopted a California-style ban solely 
for the technology sector.51  A hat tip to the Golden State, the law’s explicit 
goal was to stimulate and protect Hawaii’s high-tech industry, eliminating 
barriers to hiring and staunching brain drain.52  Three state legislatures are 
considering or recently considered bills proposing California-style bans on 
all employee noncompetes throughout the state.  Vermont last year 
introduced a bill voiding restraints on employee competition in language 
almost identical to California’s law.53  Illinois legislators proposed amending 
that state’s recently enacted vulnerable worker ban to void all noncompetes 
irrespective of the worker’s income status.54  Pennsylvania legislators 
proposed a bill declaring noncompetes “illegal, unenforceable and void as a 
matter of law.”55 
 
 
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventId=110152. 
 49  See Workforce Mobility Act, supra note 39.  Murphy’s bill ups the ante on Senator 
Rubio’s Freedom to Compete Act that would create a federal vulnerable worker ban.  See 
supra note 39 and accompanying text.  It was introduced with bi-partisan support.  
 50  The Author of this article is a signatory to the petition. See Open Markets Institute et 
al., Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non-Compete Clauses (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://openmarketsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Petition-for-Rulemaking-to-
Prohibit-Worker-Non-Compete-Clauses.pdf; Josh Eidelson, Labor Groups Petition U.S. FTC 
to Ban Non-Compete Clauses, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2019, 1:22 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-20/labor-groups-petition-u-s-ftc-to-
prohibit-non-compete-clauses.  The agency held a hearing earlier this year to consider the 
state of the law and the economic research on noncompetes and has sought public comment.  
Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, FTC 
(Jan. 9, 2020) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workpla 
ce-examining-antitrust-consumer-protection-issues. 
 51  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4(d) (West 2015).  
 52  See Enforceability TBD, supra note 31, at 887–88 (2016) (discussing the Hawaii 
statute’s legislative history). 
 53  H.B 1, 2019-2020 Leg., Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2019).  
 54  H.B. 2565, 2019 Leg., 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019). 
 55  H.B. 171, 203rd Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (Pa. 2019). 
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Meanwhile, in Oklahoma, a series of legislative and judicial 
developments have resulted in that state becoming the third jurisdiction in 
the United States to ban noncompetes outright.  Since the turn of the century, 
Oklahoma’s labor code included language similar to the noncompete bans in 
California and North Dakota.56  Beginning in the 1970s, however, in a series 
of cases primarily involving non-solicitation agreements, the state supreme 
court ruled that the Oklahoma statute applied only to complete prohibitions 
on an individual practicing his or her profession.57  These holdings suggested 
that noncompetes satisfying the common law rule of reason could survive 
the statutory prohibition.58  That interpretation was foreclosed recently when 
the Oklahoma legislature passed amendments in 200159 and 201360 to 
expressly permit nonsolicitation agreements, while declaring all other forms 
of restraint “void and unenforceable.”61  The effect of these changes is to 
overrule the prior caselaw permitting reasonable noncompetes, and the 
consensus is that Oklahoma is now a nonenforcement state.62 
The developments in Oklahoma are clearly idiosyncratic, a seeming 
 
 56  Prior to recent amendments, it provided: “Every contract by which any one is 
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind [other than in the 
context of a sale of business or dissolution of a partnership] is to that extent void.”  OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 15, §217 (2018).  For an historical account of the Oklahoma statue and its 
relationship to California and North Dakota law, see generally Jeb Boatman, Note, Contract 
Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant Not to Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA. 
L. REV. 491 (2002); Teresa L. Green, Note, The Shifting Landscape of Restrictive Covenants 
in Oklahoma, 40 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 449, 459–65 (2015). 
 57  See, e.g., Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 640 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1981); Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977); Tatum v. 
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970).  See generally Boatman, supra 
note 56, at 498–99 (describing this interpretive history); Green, supra note 3, at 459–61 
(same). 
 58  See Board of Regents, etc. v. Nat. Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 561 P.2d 499, 508 (Okla. 
1977) (concluding that the “[validity of a] restraint of trade must be determined by its 
reasonableness in view of the particular circumstance.  An agreement in illegal restraint of 
trade is void, but an agreement in reasonable restraint of trade is valid.”) 
 59  OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., §§ 217, 219A (2001) (permitting agreements that prohibit a 
former employee from “directly solicit[ing] the sale of goods, services or a combination of 
goods and services from the established customers of the former employer.”). 
 60  OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., § 219B (2013) (permitting agreements that prohibit a former 
employee “from soliciting . . . the employees or independent contractors of that person or 
business to become employees or independent contractors of another person or business”). 
 61  OKLA. STAT. tit. 15., § 219A(B) (2001). 
 62  See Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., 273 P.3d 20, 28 (Okla. 2011) (determining that “[t]he 
plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, and unequivocal language of [the 2001 
amendments] prohibits employers from binding employees to agreements which bar their 
ability to find gainful employment in the same business or industry as that of the employer” 
with the “only exception” being nonsolicitation agreements), vacated on other grounds 133 
S.Ct. 500 (2012); see generally Green, supra note 3, at 462–63.  
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rectification of a suspect interpretation of the state’s original statute.63  Yet 
the timing is telling, occurring at the onset of the new enforcement regime.  
It is unclear whether any of the pending bills proposing California-style bans 
have hopes of succeeding.64  Prospects at the federal level seem bleak with 
the nation entering an election year and Congress having failed to act on less 
dramatic legislation in the past.  At a minimum these initiatives have 
symbolic value, attesting to how far interest in noncompete reform has 
reached.  As a practical matter, they may play an anchoring role in debates 
on the subject, funneling support toward more incremental legislation like 
the “middle way” initiatives discussed next. 
3.  Seeking Middle Ground 
Beyond these two extremes, a handful of states have adopted or are 
considering adopting what I refer to as “middle way” legislation.  There is 
no one model for these laws, but they can be collectively described as 
multipart statutes that aim to restrict the use of noncompetes primarily 
through one or more of the following mechanisms: (1) limiting their 
substantive terms, (2) establishing procedural protections for workers asked 
to sign them, and (3) imposing penalties or other consequences on employers 
who violate the law. 
With respect to substantive limits, a consistent feature of middle way 
legislation is that it incorporates or exists alongside the type of vulnerable 
worker ban described previously.65  But this is just a starting point.  Middle 
way legislation goes on to set limits on the substantive terms of noncompetes 
sought from workers who satisfy the state’s income threshold.  These 
interventions are idiosyncratic and cover different types of terms.  Some seek 
to define the outer bounds of the noncompete’s scope.  For instance, 
 
 63  See Boatman, supra note 56, at 501 (“While [the recent statutory] amendments initially 
may seem radical, a close inspection . . . reveals that the amendments simply bring Oklahoma 
statutes in line with established case law.”).   
 64  While data supports the conclusion that greater employee mobility improves economic 
conditions in certain important respects, see infra Part III, noncompetes offer benefits to the 
individual employers who rely on them to protect their assets and retain talent.  From this 
perspective, noncompetes pose a classic collective action problem that a ban is well suited to 
address.  See Orly Lobel, Non-Competes, Human Capital Policy & Regional Competition, J. 
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c 
fm?abstract_id=3473186.  As Professor Orly Lobel explains, however, not all firms stand to 
benefit from so drastic a regime change and some may rationally prefer retaining the status 
quo or at least a moderate enforcement climate.  Id. at 12 (cautioning that “a one size fits all 
approach may not be appropriate” in all regions and industries).  Indeed, proposed California-
style bans have been met with staunch resistance from the business community.  See Aimee 
Keane, Non-Compete Clauses Prompt an American Backlash, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3196e048-4e6a-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a. 
 65  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 599 (2019); supra Part II.B.1. 
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Massachusetts’ new law and Connecticut’s law on physician agreements cap 
the duration of noncompetes at twelve months.66  Oregon’s and 
Washington’s laws allow the employer a maximum of eighteen months,67 
while a bill considered in New Hampshire would limit the employer to six 
months.68  Other interventions seek to regulate the terms of the exchange.  
Some state legislation requires, for instance, that employees who sign a 
noncompete after beginning employment69 receive identifiable consideration 
in addition to continued employment.70  Others mandate that the employer 
compensate the employee when and if the restraint goes into effect, requiring 
so-called “garden leave” or its equivalent.71 
 
 66  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(iv) (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
20-14p (West 2019).  
 67  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020 
(West 2020);  
 68  H. B. 346, 2019 Leg., 166th Sess. (N.H. 2019). 
 69  I refer to these types of contractualized adjustments of employment terms during the 
course of an existing employment relationship as “midterm” modifications.  See Rachel 
Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016).  
Such adjustments are problematic as a matter of contract law and from a fairness perspective 
because they are generally extracted on explicit or implicit threat of termination.  See id.; 
Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition 
Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The “Afterthought” 
Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1987); Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of 
Noncompetition Agreements when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95,118 (1998).  
 70  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(ii) (West 2020) (requiring “fair 
and reasonable consideration independent from the continuation of employment”); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.020(1)(a)(ii) (West 2020) (requiring “independent consideration”); 
see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016) (requiring such an agreement to be 
“entered into upon a bona fide advancement” in the employee’s position).  
 71  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(vii) (West 2020) (requiring garden 
leave at fifty percent of the employee’s salary or “other mutually-agreed upon 
consideration”); id. (permitting enforcement of a noncompete following a termination due to 
layoff only in the event that the employer continues to pay the employee’s salary); S. B. 635, 
2018 Leg., 218th Sess. (N.J. 2018) (requiring garden leave at full salary); H. B. 346, 2019 
Leg., 166th Sess. (N.H. 2019) (requiring fifty percent of the employee’s salary). “Garden 
leave” is a concept inherited from the U.K. that requires an employer to pay the employee for 
any post-work period in which the employee is prohibited from competing.  See generally 
Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability 
of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002) (discussing history 
and current state of the doctrine in England).  It has appeal as a possible solution to the 
problem of forced unemployment resulting from overly broad restraints. Yet it has received 
relatively little attention from scholars, Professor Sullivan being one of the few exceptions. 
Tending the Garden, supra note 12, at 322–23 (predicting increased adoption of garden leave 
provisions in high-level employment contracts with mixed results for employees); see also 
Estlund, supra note 7 at 425 (suggesting that garden leave might be made a condition of 
enforceability which would force the employer to bear the cost of employee’s “forced 
idleness”); Lembrich, supra note 71, at 2321–23 (suggesting that garden leave offers 
employers greater predictability of enforcement while better balancing the competing 
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Still other substantive interventions are aimed at limiting or 
encouraging particular terms without directly mandating them.  In Oregon, 
for instance, an employer who provides garden leave may enforce a 
noncompete without regard to the state’s minimum income threshold.72  In 
Massachusetts a restriction limited to the “specific types of services” 
provided by the employee in the geographic area where those services were 
provided is “presumptively reasonable.”73  In Washington, a duration 
exceeding eighteen months is “presume[d] . . .  unreasonable and 
unenforceable.”74 Such provisions encourage employers to draft within 
preferred limits in order to obtain what are essentially evidentiary 
advantages. 
With respect to procedural protections, a common feature of middle 
way statutes is the requirement of advance notice of the noncompete 
combined with an opportunity to review.  Oregon requires at least two 
weeks;75 Massachusetts requires ten days.76  A bill recently considered in 
New Jersey would have required thirty business days in advance of signing 
as well as notice of the employer’s intent to enforce the noncompete within 
ten days of the employee’s separation.77  Massachusetts’s law and legislation 
proposed  in several neighboring states require the employee to be informed 
of the right to consult counsel.78  At least one state proposal would have 
imposed a “poster” requirement of the type commonly mandated by federal 
employment protection legislation.79 
 
interests of restrained workers). Empirical research examining possible changes to wages and 
mobility of noncompete signers post-adoption would be of great value. 
 72  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(6) (West 2016) (declaring a noncompete enforceable 
“without regard” to the statute’s vulnerable worker ban if the employer provides at least fifty 
percent of the employee’s salary or fifty percent of the median income for a family of four for 
the duration of the restriction); cf. H. B. 6913, 2019 Leg., (Conn. 2019) (permitting an 
employer that provides at least one year of full pay to a restrained employee to exceed the 
bill’s twelve month duration cap by up to two years ).  
 73  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L(b)(iii) (West 2020). 
 74  WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.62.020(2) (West 2020).  Florida has had statutory 
minimum and maximum duration presumptions since the 1990s, well before the current 
legislative trend.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(d)(1) (“[A] court shall presume 
reasonable in time any restraint 6 months or less in duration and shall presume unreasonable 
in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration.”). 
 75  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1)(a)(A) (West 2016). 
 76  MASS GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 149 § 24L(b)(ii) (West 2020). 
 77  S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). Such a provision has the effect of a 
statute of limitations, allowing the employee to act freely and without fear of litigation 
following the proscribed time period.   
 78  MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 24L(b)(iii); S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 
2018); H.B. 6913, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019); H.B. 346, 166th Leg. Sess., 2019 
Session (N.H. 2019). 
 79  The New Jersey bill would have required employers to post a copy of either the law 
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A final, albeit less common, feature of some middle way legislation and 
proposed laws is that they establish penalties or other consequences aimed 
at deterring and redressing employer violations.  Maine’s law grants the state 
department of labor enforcement responsibility and imposes a civil fine of at 
least $5,000 on any employer who violates the law.80  Washington’s law goes 
further, creating a private right of action for victims of unlawful noncompete 
practices.  Signers can recover actual damages sustained as a result of a 
violation of the law or liquidated damages, plus costs and attorneys’ fees.81 
The “middle way” legislation described here, along with future state 
initiatives, will likely prove a critical component of the new enforcement 
regime.  In the absence of federal action or the will to impose outright bans, 
these laws will be the primary pathway for reform.  Their ability to 
fundamentally alter employers’ use of noncompetes and the rules of 
enforcement will depend on the particular measures adopted, a question I 
turn to in Part IV. At a minimum, they impose important, if discrete, new 
limits on employer noncompete practices and, in some cases, additional 
protections for employees. 
III.  JUSTIFYING THE NEW REGIME 
The previous section provided an overview of the new enforcement 
regime.  This section seeks to explain it.  It would be rash, of course, to 
attribute the new enforcement regime to any particular cause or 
development.  It arises, however, in tandem with growing empirical research 
questioning long-held assumptions about the use of noncompetes and their 
effects on both workers and the economy.  There are at least two implications 
from this work.  First, there is now good reason to believe that noncompetes 
adversely affect wages and economic growth.82  Second, there is growing 
evidence that employers overreach in their use of noncompetes, either by 
requiring them in situations where they are unenforceable or by drafting 
stronger restraints than the law allows.83  Such research validates the 
speculations of some legal scholars, among them Professor Sullivan, who 
 
itself or an agency-approved summary in a prominent workplace location.  S.B. 635, 218th 
Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018); see also The “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(imposing a similar requirement).   
 80  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 599-A6 (2019). 
 81  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.62.080 (West 2019); see also S.B. 635, 218th Leg., Ann. 
Sess. (N.J. 2018) (protecting an employee who challenges the validity of a noncompete 
against employer reprisals).  In Washington, these remedies are available to the employee 
even if the court partially enforces the agreement.  § 49.62.080(3).  This strikes a critical 
balance that I will take up further in Part IV, infra. 
 82  See infra Part III.A. 
 83  See infra Part III.B. 
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have asserted that current doctrinal limits on noncompetes do not go far 
enough in addressing their pernicious collective effects or policing 
opportunistic employer behavior.84  This section examines the emerging data 
through the lens of Professor Sullivan’s past work and demonstrates how his 
writings lay a theoretical groundwork for recent empirical research that is, in 
turn, fueling the new enforcement regime. 
A.  The Collective Effects of Individual Agreements 
The law and economics of noncompetes are subtle and complex.  On 
one hand, noncompetes are private agreements to which the parties assent, 
presumably because they deem the agreement to be in their interests.  
Freedom of contract principles dictate that they be enforced as written.85  On 
the other hand, noncompetes are restraints of trade that reduce opportunities 
for those in the field and the public’s access to their goods and services.86  
Open competition and principles of free trade dictate that they be limited to 
ensure a robust economy. 
In the battle between these competing first principles, freedom of 
contract has long been the victor.  The traditional law and economics view 
held that the removal of any one individual from the field of competition was 
 
 84  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1151 (arguing that current judicial doctrine fails 
to adequately discourage overbroad restraints); Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–
23 (describing collective effects of noncompetes including depressed wages and employee 
“lock in”); See also Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1189 (suggesting that employers 
impermissibly use noncompetes to restrain workers rather than protect their legitimate 
interests); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The 
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 963, 976–84 (2006) (arguing that employers’ opportunistic contracting practices 
constrain workers’ ability to evaluate or bargain over noncompetes) [hereinafter “The Dilution 
of Employee Bargaining Power”]; Estlund, supra note 7, at 424–25 (arguing for a “strict 
scrutiny” approach to noncompetes and other “conditionally waivable” employee rights); cf. 
Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41, at 667–68 (describing the various ways that 
California employers seek to subvert the law and constrain worker mobility despite the state’s 
interdiction against noncompetes). 
 85  See Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that noncompetes should be enforced absent grounds for ordinary 
contract defenses); Callahan, supra note 28, at 725–27 (same); cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints 
on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1993) (asserting that rules 
limiting noncompete enforcement undermine individual freedom to alienate one’s human 
capital). 
 86  See Blake, supra note 1, at 687 (“One situation in which social cost might be different 
from private cost exists when the restraint is being used, either by the employer alone or in a 
bilateral arrangement with his employees, to monopolize the business in a specific 
community.”); Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in 
Employment Contracts (Sept. 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3453433 21–23 (offering a 
taxonomy of the adverse effects of noncompetes on labor and product markets). 
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unlikely to do economic damage to any industry.87  Presumably, the rule of 
reason could do the job of discerning between those restraints that merely 
limited opportunity for the individual signer and those that had broader anti-
competitive effects.88  As applied, however, the rule of reason focuses almost 
exclusively on the competing interests of the individual litigants. Many 
formulations of the basic rule of reason require consideration of the 
agreement’s potential impact on the public interest.89  Yet few courts actually 
engage in that inquiry,90 nor is it clear how such a factual determination 
would be made.91  In a subset of cases where the noncompete involves a 
health care provider or other individual whose services are necessary to the 
public welfare, courts will sometimes consider whether other providers are 
available in the former employer’s geographic area in an effort to protect 
consumer choice.92  Outside that situation, however, courts  mostly  treat 
their evaluation of the harm to the individual worker as a proxy for the 
noncompete’s fairness to the public.93 
 
 87  See, e.g., Outsource Int’l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 670 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“It would be 
unlikely for the vitality of competition to depend on the ability of a former employee to 
compete with his former employer.”); Sterk, supra note 85, at 407 (“The anticompetitive 
effect of enforcing restrictive covenants. . .will probably be insignificant. Indeed, only the 
employer and the 
employee are likely to see any effects.”); see generally LOBEL, supra note 7 (describing the 
“orthodox” view of noncompetes held by early law and economic thinkers).  
 88  See Outsource Int’l, Inc., 192 F.3d at 670 (Posner, J., dissenting) (suggesting that anti-
competitive effects from individual noncompetes are “[s]o unlikely that it would make little 
sense to place a cloud of suspicion over such covenants, rather than considering competitive 
effects on a case by case basis”).  
 89  See, e.g., Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 F. Supp. 2d 429, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011; 
Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 2011); Dawson v. Temps 
Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 727 (Ark. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 
(1981) (declaring a noncompete unreasonably in restraint of trade where “the promisee’s need 
is outweighed by . . . the likely injury to the public”). 
 90   See Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1173–74 (critiquing courts for paying 
lip-service to the public interest without actually applying this prong of the test); Gillian 
Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost 
Analysis, 76 IND. L. J. 49, 56 (2001) (“The bite of the reasonableness analysis rests principally 
in the [factors] pertaining to the scope of the restrictions: a restraint deemed reasonable in 
scope typically will not be invalidated due to public interest or hardship alone.”). 
 91  Professor Sullivan lays out a series of factors that should come into play in assessing 
a noncompete’s public effects, including the degree of labor market concentration and the 
specialized or essential nature of the employee’s work.  See Neglected Stepchild, supra note 
10, at 647–50.  However, it may be beyond the capacity of courts to make such assessments 
in the context of individual cases.  I return briefly to this concern in my proscription infra, 
which focuses primarily on employer overreach rather than antitrust concerns. 
 92  See, e.g., Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. 2011); Carter-Shields 
v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 93  See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 669, 739 (1982) (“[C]ase-by-case judicial treatment 
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Professor Sullivan was an early critic of this approach.  In the late 1970s 
he published Revisiting the “Neglected Stepchild”: Antitrust Treatment of 
Postemployment Restraints of Trade, in which he argued that the existing 
common law gave insignificant attention to the economic implications of 
noncompetes.94  He pointed out that, under antitrust law, neither the 
agreement of the parties nor the legitimate interests of the employer could 
justify a restraint deemed unreasonable.95 As a consequence, he argued that  
otherwise “reasonable” noncompetes could violate Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and that state-level noncompete doctrine might be in conflict with 
federal antitrust law.96  To remedy this problem, he asserted, “courts should 
look to the general use of [noncompetes] in the industry to determine whether 
the collective effect of such practices is to lock-in classes of key employees 
so as to create a general barrier to competition.”97 
Underlying Sullivan’s analysis were two factual assumptions:  first, that 
the incidence of noncompetes was far wider than could be surmised from 
reported caselaw;98 and second, that as a consequence, noncompetes were 
likely to have collective effects beyond what a court would likely discern 
when looking solely at the relative positions of the litigants in any one case.99  
Writing in 1977, Professor Sullivan acknowledged the dearth of empirical 
data available to support those assumptions and speculated that the collective 
effects of noncompetes might well be immeasurable.100 
Today we know that Professor Sullivan’s premises were correct and his 
fears well founded.  First, noncompetes and other instruments that restrict 
employee mobility are more widely used than once supposed.  Industry-level 
data suggests that they are quite routine in certain professions—notably 
among physicians and engineers—and that they are a bread-and-butter-
 
of the public injury factor has not extended beyond a concern for the prevention of monopoly 
or serious anticompetitive impact.  Public injury has been treated generically—that is, as the 
rationale for antimonopoly prohibitions and not as a separate negative factual requirement.”). 
 94  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622. 
 95  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 642. 
 96  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623, 627. 
 97  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 647–48. 
 98  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23 (suggesting that the reported decisions 
on noncompetes “constituted the proverbial iceberg’s tip”). 
 99  See Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623. 
 100  Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 622–23 (characterizing suppositions about the 
incidence of noncompetes as the product of an “armchair survey”).  This is not a criticism of 
Professor Sullivan’s work, but rather the norm in legal scholarship, particularly in the 
noncompete literature prior to the boom in empirical scholarship discussed infra.  See 
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 372 (describing the wealth of “provocative, but 
ultimately limited” studies “fueled by unsupported assumptions and by high-profile anecdotal 
evidence of purportedly abusive practices involving noncompetes”).  
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feature of CEO contracts.101  But beyond these highly skilled, highly 
compensated job sectors, noncompetes appear with frequency in ordinary 
employment relationships.  In 2014, researchers administered the first 
nationwide representative survey of labor force participants asking about 
their experience with noncompetes.102  The results of the 2014 Noncompete 
Project revealed that nearly one in five participants was bound by a 
noncompete at the time of response,103 and nearly forty percent had signed 
one at some point in their career.104  Presently, an estimated twenty-eight 
million workers are subject to a noncompete.105  Moreover, while the 
majority of workers in the study who had signed noncompetes held a college 
degree, twelve percent of those without a degree had signed one as well.106  
Thus, the mere incidence of noncompetes suggests reason for concern. 
Second, there is increased evidence that noncompetes in the aggregate 
adversely affect regional economies and labor markets.  Twenty years after 
Professor Sullivan’s contribution, Professor Ronald Gilson wrote a highly 
influential article, arguing that California’s aberrational approach to 
noncompetes—its strict rule that all employee noncompetes are void and 
unenforceable—explained, at least in part, the phenomenal growth and 
economic success of Silicon Valley as compared to Massachusetts’ less 
robust Route 128 high-tech corridor.107  Gilson theorized that the 
unenforceability of noncompetes in California resulted in greater 
“knowledge spillovers”—the transmission of information from company to 
company through mobile employees—enabling and sustaining more 
successful regional development.108 
 
 101  According to researchers, forty-three percent of engineers, fifty percent of physicians, 
and between fifty and eighty percent of Chief Executive Officers sign noncompetes.  See 
Norman Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 497 (2016) (summarizing studies).  There is also firm-level data demonstrating that over 
fifty percent of companies use noncompetes according to their human resources personnel.  
Id. at 520.  That research, however, does not reveal how widely each company uses the 
agreements.  Id. (discussing the limited value of such undifferentiated data). 
 102  See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force 
(U. of Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625714. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 2. 
 106  Id. at 2–3.  That is not to say that noncompetes are always unlawful or unjustified with 
non-degree holding employees, only that it belies past assumptions that they were used 
sparingly with key employees. 
 107  See Gilson, supra note 3, at 577–80. 
 108  Gilson, supra note 3, at 578.  For a more thorough account of the concept of spillovers 
and its treatment in early economic literature, see Alan Hyde, Intellectual Property 
Justifications for Restricting Employee Mobility: A Critical Appraisal in Light of the 
Economic Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
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Gilson’s Article stoked new interest in noncompete enforcement and 
the regulation of human capital.109  Its legacy includes both a richer legal 
literature110 and a body of empirical work testing the broader economic 
effects of noncompete enforcement.111  Much of the latter research supports 
the positive connection between labor mobility and regional growth that 
underlies Gilson’s argument: by studying various indicators—including firm 
entry, industry spinouts, and venture capital impact, among others—and 
comparing them across jurisdictions, researchers have concluded that 
noncompete enforcement reduces firm-level competition, entrepreneurship, 
and growth.112 
That research has also revealed the pernicious effects of noncompete 
covenants on labor markets. Sullivan’s motivation in appealing to antitrust 
law was not to enhance economic development but to protect workers.  In 
his 1977 article he sketched a troubling picture of non-compete signers 
indentured to their employers or forced to take career detours, resulting in 
lower wages and limited opportunity.113  In fact, almost all of the post-Gilson 
empirical work focusing on labor market effects confirm this view.  Not 
surprisingly, noncompete enforcement is associated with longer job tenure 
and reduced mobility.114  Yet it is also associated with lower wages, belying 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 357, 361–62 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., 2012). 
 109  See Lobel, supra note 64 (crediting Gilson with creating the field of human capital 
law).   
 110  Of particular note is the work of Professor Orly Lobel, whose scholarship expands on 
Gilson’s to examine, among other things, the role of other forms of “human capital controls” 
and their intersection with intellectual property law, economic theory, and the business and 
management literature.  See, e.g, LOBEL, supra note 7, at 51; Lobel, supra note 64; Gentlemen 
Prefer Bonds, supra note 41; Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law 
and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015). 
 111  See generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 523–34 (providing an overview of 
the literature); Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, 381-89 (same). 
 112  This research is methodologically diverse and has been exhaustively catalogued by 
others. For examples, see, e.g., Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: 
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 427 (2011); Evan Starr, 
Natarajan Balasubramanian & Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete 
Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 MGMT. SCI. 552, 
552–53 (2018); Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic 
Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175, 194 (2003). For a 
comprehensive literature review, including an account of the limitations of existing data, see 
generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 523–34; Posner, supra note 86, at 18–19; 
Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 381–89. 
 113  See Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 623. 
 114  See, e.g., Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al., Locked In? The Enforceability of 
Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers, J. HUM. RESOURCES 
(forthcoming) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2905782 (finding 8% 
fewer job opportunities and lower cumulative earnings among technology workers in 
noncompete enforcing jurisdictions verses non-enforcement jurisdictions); Matt Marx, 
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classical economic theory that predicts that signers will receive a wage 
premium for accepting a post-employment restraint.115  Studies put the wage 
differential at anywhere from two to eight percent, depending on the market 
studied, with estimates of between fourteen and twenty-one percent for those 
who actually sign.116  There is evidence that negative wage and mobility 
effects are felt not just by rank-and-file workers, but also by high-level, 
highly skilled employees who have significant bargaining power.117 
In sum, Sullivan’s views have become mainstream.  State attorneys 
general and private litigants are leveraging the very theory he espoused—
employer liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act—in challenging 
franchise anti-poach agreements and the noncompete practices of employers 
with significant market power.118  Meanwhile, both regulators and scholars 
are giving serious consideration to the idea that antitrust law should have 
something more to say about labor market concentration.119  That does not 
 
Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete 
Experiment, 55(6) MGMT. SCI. 875, 876 (2009) (finding reduced mobility among patent 
holding-employees in Michigan following that state’s reversal of policy in favor of 
noncompete enforcement); Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra  note 102 (finding 11% increase 
in job tenure for noncompete signers); cf. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete 
Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 702–03 
(2011) (finding more than 87% of job moves by engineers subject to a noncompete were 
industry exits). 
 115  See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 
J. LEGAL STUD.  93, 99–101 (1981) (proceeding from this assumption). 
 116  See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, 
Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011) (finding 
8.2% reduction in executive compensation growth following stricter non-compete 
enforcement); Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of 
NonCompete Agreements (Sept. 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452240 (finding 2-3% 
wage increase among low-wage workers after passage of Oregon vulnerable worker ban); 
Starr, supra note 30 (finding 4% wage difference between enforcing and non-enforcing 
states); see generally Posner, supra note 86 (summarizing findings). 
 117  See, e.g., Balasubramanian, et al., supra note 114 (technologists); Mark J. Garmaise, 
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm 
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011) (corporate executives); Marx, supra note 114 
(engineers); but see Kurt Lavetti, et al. The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service 
Workers: Evidence from Physicians (2018), http://kurtlavetti.com/UIPNC_vf.pdf (finding 
physicians who sign noncompetes earn more and have greater returns than those who do not); 
see generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 101, at 518–20, 526–31 (summarizing these 
findings and others). 
 118  See supra Part II.B.1.  
 119  See Ioana Marinescu & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor 
Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1023-33 (2019) (applying “well-established economic doctrine 
and traditional antitrust rules” to “mergers that facilitate anticompetitive wage and salary 
suppression”); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor 
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (2018) (arguing for regulatory consideration of 
labor market effects in approving corporate mergers); Federal Trade Commission Announces 
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 4 
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mean that antitrust law is or need be the primary vehicle for curtailing the 
economic harms associated with widespread noncompete use; clearly state-
level legislation will have a large role to play in the new enforcement 
regime.120  The point, rather, is that the alarm Sullivan sounded forty-odd 
years ago on the macro-effects of noncompetes has been not only justified, 
it is at last being heeded. 
B.  Employer Overreach and Employee Ignorance 
The previous section asserted that the collective effects of noncompetes 
on wages and growth are insufficiently captured by the common law rule of 
reason and its statutory overlay.  The argument is agnostic, however,  as to 
employer compliance with that body of law and to the legitimacy of any one 
contract.  Even noncompetes that strike a reasonable balance between 
employer and employee might, if sufficiently pervasive in a particular 
industry, result in externalities justifying further regulation.  But are 
noncompetes generally reasonable?  That is to say, does the rule of reason 
adequately police individual fairness, even if it gives short shrift to broader 
market concerns? 
Many legal scholars, myself included, have long been skeptical of 
employer noncompete practices, particularly in the era of standard form 
contracts and corporatized human resource departments.121  This fear is 
 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/hearings-competition-consumer-protection-
21st-century/hearings-announcement_0_0.pdf  (setting hearing on the “evidence and analysis 
of monopsony power. . . in labor markets”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Public Workshop On 
Competition In Labor Markets (Sept. 23, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/atr/public-workshop-
competition-labor-markets (holding public workshop on “the role of antitrust [in] labor 
markets and promoting robust competition for the American worker”); Fed. Trade Comm., 
Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues (Jan. 
9, 2020) at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workplace-
examining-antitrust-consumer-protection-issues (holding public workshop “to examine 
whether there is a sufficient legal basis and empirical economic support to promulgate a 
Commission Rule that would restrict the use of non-compete clauses in employer-employee 
employment contracts”).  Federal interest in the subject began in 2016 during the Obama 
administration but waned thereafter.  See Treasury Report, Non-Compete Contracts: 
Economic Effects and Policy Implications at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-
competes%20Report.pdf; White House 2016 Report Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of 
the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/si 
tes/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf.  It is now being picked up at the agency 
level.   
 120  See supra Part II.B. 
 121  See e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, 
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2007) (describing use 
of “boilerplate [noncompete] documents, unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented 
as a condition of employment, often subsequent to the start of work”) [hereinafter Rise of 
Delayed Term]; The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 978 
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compounded by the reality that the enforceability of most noncompetes is 
unlikely to be litigated.122  Thirty years after his antitrust contribution, 
Sullivan expanded on these concerns. In a 2009 article focusing on the 
prevalence of “unenforceable contract terms” in employment relationships, 
he argued that the current law is ineffective in policing overbroad 
noncompete terms and fails to adequately deter employer overreach.123  He 
argued that owing to information deficits and risk aversion, employees are 
unlikely to question or challenge an employer’s demand for a noncompete.124  
During the course of employment, these employees may avoid seeking out 
other jobs or reject alternate employment because they either assume the 
noncompete they signed is binding or are unwilling to take the risk of being 
sued.125  At the same time, employers face little to no legal consequence for 
using overbroad agreements.  The majority of courts modify unreasonable 
terms, effectively redrafting the agreement to comply with the law.  This 
incentivizes continued overreaching.126 
Whether employers seek more than the law allows is, ultimately, an 
empirical question, one that research has begun to address.  In turning to that 
data, it is useful to distinguish  between three forms of overreach, which I 
characterize as follows: first, and most blatantly, an employer might act in 
direct contravention of a statutory prohibition, by requesting what I refer to 
simply as “illegal” noncompetes.  Thus, an employer might insist on a 
noncompete, despite operating in a nonenforcement jurisdiction, or request 
 
(describing how employers exact noncompetes through “cubewrap contracting practices” that 
make the agreement appear to be “simple routine paperwork”); Estlund, supra note 7, at 423 
(noting that some employers use noncompetes “as near-boilerplate . . .for a wide variety of 
positions, with little regard to the particulars of the position or to whether employees are privy 
to protectible information”); Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7,  at 1129 (concluding  that, 
while some employers issue unenforceable noncompete covenants by mistake,  it is “certain 
that invalid [noncompete covenants] continue to be used by those who are well aware that 
they are unenforceable as written”); cf. Gentlemen Prefer Bonds, supra note 41, at 667–68 
(describing how California employers intentionally undermine the state’s nonenforcement 
policy through no poach agreements and other practices). 
 122  Professor Blake raised this concern eighty years ago.  See Blake, supra note 1, at 682 
(“For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in 
terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations.”); see also The 
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 975–76; Rise of Delayed Term, 
supra note 121, at 641; Estlund, supra note 7, at 421; Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 
1134; Neglected Stepchild, supra note 10, at 647–48. 
 123  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1131–32 (identifying “disconnect” between 
law’s purported goal of deterring overreach and “the actions of the courts on the ground” that 
are willing to partially enforce overbroad agreements).  
 124  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1134–36 (“[T]he obvious reason why one party 
would seek a [noncompete covenant] clause it knew to be unenforceable is that it believed the 
other party to be unaware of the fact and likely to remain unaware of it.”). 
 125  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1149. 
 126  Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1147. 
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one from an employee in a profession where restraints are categorically 
void.127  Second, even where noncompetes are statutorily permitted, the 
employer might demand one absent any claim to a protectible interest.  For 
instance, certain employers might request noncompetes as a matter of course 
from employees at all levels of its organization, including those who could 
not plausibly have access to propriety information or relationships.  
Borrowing loosely from the antitrust discourse, I refer to these agreements 
as “naked” noncompetes because they serve purely to give the employer a 
competitive edge by preventing employee defection.128  Finally, an employer 
might overreach in the terms of the agreement itself, what I refer to as 
“overbroad” noncompetes.  In such a case, the noncompete is justified by the 
employee’s access to protectible assets, but the agreement is overly broad in 
scope, restricting the employee from working in too wide a market, for too 
long a period of time, or in too wide a region. 
Recent data support the conclusion that employers in fact engage in at 
least some of these forms of overreach.  We know, for instance, that 
employers use illegal noncompetes in violation of state statutes.  The 2014 
Noncompete Project found that noncompetes appear with equal frequency 
across jurisdictions, despite differences in states’ approaches to 
enforceability.129  That is, researchers found no statistical difference in the 
number of respondents bound by a noncompete in nonenforcing states 
(California and North Dakota) compared to those that allow them.130  Since 
employers are presumably aware of the legal regime in which they are 
operating, this data raises the concerning possibility that employers in 
nonenforcement jurisdictions are capitalizing on employee ignorance to skirt 
state law prohibitions.131 
 
 127  See, e.g.,  AZ. REV. STAT. § 23-494 (voiding noncompetes with broadcast employees); 
DEL. CODE ANN. § 6-2707 (voiding noncompetes among physicians); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 480-4(d) (West 2015) (voiding noncompetes with technology workers); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 5-37-33.  .   
 128  “Naked” restraints of trade are contracts wherein “the sole object is to restrain trade in 
order to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the common law to 
foster.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir 1898), aff’d, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). They are generally void per se or subject to only a truncated inquiry. 
See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1904 (distinguishing between “naked” and “ancillary” 
restraints of trade and the relevant test for lawfulness). 
 129  Prescott, Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 370 (finding that the incidence of 
noncompetition agreements in particular states bears little relationship to the jurisdiction’s 
enforcement rate). 
 130  In fact, the incidence of noncompetes in non-enforcing states was slightly higher than 
their incidence in those jurisdictions deemed most hospitable to enforcement.  Prescott, 
Bishara & Starr, supra note 30, at 461. 
 131  To be sure, some of these agreements may be the product of mistake.  In the age of 
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The same research gives reason to conclude that employers are also 
overreaching within enforcing jurisdictions, demanding naked noncompetes 
from employees who do not pose a competitive risk.  As discussed 
previously, the 2014 Noncompete Project revealed that a surprising number 
of employees without college degrees have signed noncompetes.132  While 
the probability of signing a noncompete increased with income level, 
between twelve and twenty-one percent of workers with annual income of 
$60,000 and below were likely to have signed as well.133  Moreover, various 
sources—including the previously-described investigative work of State 
Attorney General offices, isolated industry-specific studies, and a wealth of 
court decisions and anecdotal sources—reveal the use of noncompetes across 
a range of occupations including sandwich maker, hair stylist, gardener, 
daycare worker, and security guard.134 
As of yet, we have only caselaw evidence of the third form of 
overreach—overbroad agreements whose terms exceed the bounds of the 
employer’s protectible interest.  What we know empirically about illegal and 
naked agreements derives from surveys of labor market participants, which 
provide valuable data on the incidence of noncompetes but nothing about 
their content.  The corpus of cases in which courts modify overbroad 
agreements attests the existence of this form of overreach, but research 
examining the agreements themselves is needed to verify and understand the 
scope of the problem. 
Regardless of the type of overreach at issue, data about employee 
mobility and noncompete perception support the assumption that such 
agreements adversely affect employee behavior.  Comparing the mobility 
patterns of noncompete signers across jurisdictions with different legal 
 
standard form agreements, less sophisticated employers may simply apply an agreement used 
elsewhere in its organization or one obtained commercially without regard to its enforceability 
in the relevant jurisdiction or without vetting its suitability to the particular employees asked 
to sign.  See Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1151 (recognizing the possibility that 
unenforceable noncompetes are sometimes the result of honest error).  I refer to these 
noncompetes as “legacy” agreements because the documents themselves are inherited from 
other contexts.  Mistake alone, however, likely accounts for only a small subset of 
noncompetes found in non-enforcement jurisdictions. Id.  
 132  See Starr, Prescott & Bishara supra note 102, at 17; supra Part III.A. 
 133  Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 102, at 42, fig.4.  
 134  See generally STATE OF ILLINOIS, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OVERUSE OF 
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS 3 (June 13, 2018), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/fil 
es/webpage_materials_papers_madigan_flanagan_june_13_2018.pdf; Steven Greenhouse, 
Non-compete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-
array-of-jobs.html.  To be sure, employee skill and pay levels are not perfectly correlated with 
access to propriety information or relationships, and it is possible that employers have a 
legally cognizable interest with respect to some employees in such positions. 
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regimes, the 2014 Noncompete Project found that signers in non-enforcing 
jurisdictions had the same increased job tenure and lower defection rates as 
signers in enforcing jurisdictions.135  Forty percent of signers across 
jurisdictions cited their noncompete as a reason for declining an offer of 
employment irrespective of the law in their jurisdiction.136  In addition, fear 
of being sued, beliefs about enforceability, and reminders from their 
employers were more predictive of whether an employee would decline a 
competitor’s offer than the applicable state law.137  Thus the project authors 
conclude that “many employees may decide to decline employment offers 
they would have otherwise taken simply because they incorrectly believe 
their noncompete is enforceable.”138  In short, the in terrorem effects of 
noncompete agreements are not hypothetical.  Employers are well-
positioned not only to overreach in requesting noncompetes, but to reap 
advantages from those terms over the life of the employment relationship, 
regardless of their enforceability.139 
Finally, there is increasing evidence that employers not only overreach 
in the various ways described, but they also manipulate the bargaining 
process.  In two earlier works, I argued that the contractual view of 
 
 135  See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of 
(Unenforceable) Contracts 16 (Mich. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 16-032, 2019), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2858637 [hereinafter The Behavioral Effects of 
(Unenforceable) Contracts] 
 136  Id. at 24. 
 137  Id. at 25. 
 138  Id. at 27.  In a related information experiment, the authors of the 2014 noncompete 
project discovered that subjects greatly over-estimated the enforceability of noncompetes, 
including in states where they are completely unenforceable.  See J.J. Prescott & Evan Starr, 
Subjective Beliefs About the Enforceability of Noncompetes, (Powerpoint Presented June 
2019) (on file with Author).  These results are unsurprising in light of prior studies 
demonstrating that employees misunderstand employer termination rights.  See, e.g., Pauline 
T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal 
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 139 (1997) (finding that 74% of 
survey respondents incorrectly believed that employers could not fire an at-will employee for 
purely cost-saving reasons); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: 
Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess 
Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 335 (2002) (finding 50% 
incorrect response rate in similar study).  See Prescott & Starr, supra note 138.  Yet employee 
misperceptions about employer termination rights and the enforceability of noncompetes 
appear to run in opposite directions:  employees underestimate the employer’s ability to 
terminate employment at will while overestimating the employer’s ability to enforce a 
noncompete.  For this and other reasons, further study of employee perception is warranted.   
 139  Indeed, the research reveals a further cause for concern: employers in non-enforcing 
jurisdictions in some cases affirmatively “remind” exiting employees of their noncompetes, a 
move that may well be calculated to induce compliance with what the employer knows is an 
unenforceable agreement.  The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts, supra note 
135, at 4 
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noncompetes as a “bargained-for” term of the employment relationship is 
inapplicable in part because employers are likely to delay requesting a 
noncompete until after a new employee begins working.140  The significance 
of this type of “cubewrap” contracting, as I have referred to it, is that it 
undercuts any ability for the employee to reject the noncompete, renegotiate 
its terms, or decline the job should the employer prove intransigent and the 
noncompete too objectionable.141  Indeed, the 2014 Noncompete Project 
revealed that thirty to forty percent of workers are asked to sign noncompetes 
after they have accepted work, often when they are already on the job.142  In 
other words, even the exceptional employee—the one who knows the law 
and has the wherewithal to challenge the employer—is constrained in any 
attempt to bargain over the necessity of a noncompete or the breadth of its 
terms. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW 
The previous section argued that new empirical research supports the 
claims of legal theorists and justifies, if not compels, serious reform.  The 
next question is whether the new regime will meet the mark: will new 
legislation, along with continued regulatory investigation and enforcement, 
do the job of reducing the incidence of noncompetes and their collective 
effects on markets?  Can these efforts successfully police employer behavior, 
disincentivizing and remedying employer overreach and manipulative 
practices?  It is, of course, too soon to answer such questions—the new 
regime is only just unfolding.  Neither is so broad an assessment possible 
within the scope of this Article.  Yet to the extent that legislatures or other 
regulators are considering options for reform, it is appropriate to offer 
preliminary thoughts on the direction of the movement thus far and the 
course it ought to follow. 
A few disclaimers are in order.  First, I will focus on the role of state 
legislation targeting the problem of employer overreach.  This does not 
reflect a preference for keeping the issue of noncompete enforceability 
 
 140  See Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 121, at 637; The Dilution of Employee 
Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 963. 
 141  See Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 121, at 653–54 (citing the legion of practical 
impediments to an employee negotiating or rejecting a noncompete agreement after accepting 
a job offer); The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 966–67 
(“[C]ubewrap noncompetes succeed in further diluting an employee’s already tenuous grip 
on any form of bargaining power. They strip away the worker’s ability, both at the outset and 
during the course of employment, to refuse to deal.”). 
 142  Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra note 102, at 46, Table 2; see also Marx, supra note 
114 at 706 (finding that 47% of sampled engineers signed their noncompete on or after the 
first day of work). 
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within the ambit of state regulation; indeed, there may be reasons to prefer a 
federal approach.143  As previously noted, however, the likelihood of federal 
action appears dim, whereas states have already begun to enact laws and 
continue to entertain new bills.144  Second, in considering state legislation, I 
will focus on what I consider the critical features of effective “middle way” 
statutes.  This is where I see both the potential for movement as well as the 
need for guidance.145  Finally, I will direct my comments to the particular 
problem of employer overreach and resulting in terrorem effects.  That is not 
to discount the possibility that even reasonably drafted, appropriately 
targeted, and fairly obtained noncompetes could, if sufficiently pervasive, 
have aggregate market effects justifying further regulation.  Rather, I leave 
that determination, and the job of striking a suitable balance, to economists 
and others with such expertise. 
Turning to the task at hand, I believe that states seeking to quash 
opportunistic noncompetes of all kinds, and not merely those imposed on 
vulnerable populations, must make at least three specific reforms.  They must 
(1) adopt robust disclosure requirements that go beyond mere notice; (2) 
eliminate courts’ ability to modify overbroad agreements; and (3) create a 
full-fledged private right of action that grants employees expedited access to 
the courts or reviewing agencies.  I will discuss each of these briefly. 
To begin, reducing in terrorem effects requires reeducation.  It is both 
common sense and, increasingly, an empirical fact that employees do not 
understand their rights or their employers’ when it comes to noncompete 
enforcement.146  State legislation that requires advance disclosure of the 
agreement does not address this problem, even if the disclosure alerts 
employees of their right to seek counsel.  Few employees are likely to incur 
 
 143  To the extent we conceive of restrictions on employee mobility as an antitrust matter, 
it is squarely within federal jurisdiction.  See Glick, supra note 1, at 404–417 (applying 
antitrust principles).  In addition, federal legislation would create welcome uniformity. See 
Moffat, supra note 34, at 965. The variation in state laws thus far will doubtlessly pose 
enormous compliance challenges for employers.  On the single issue of vulnerable worker 
status, for instance, no two state laws passed thus far use precisely the same criteria in 
establishing the relevant income threshold.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  It is 
possible that the desire for consistency and lower compliance costs could incent employers to 
support model or uniform state legislation that, while limiting the enforceability of 
noncompetes, would achieve greater predictability.  The Uniform Law Commission in 2018 
appointed a study committee to explore the matter.  See  https://www.uniformlaws.org/proje 
cts/committees/study.  As of yet, however, it has issued no proposals. 
 144  See Part II.B. supra. 
 145  States will likely continue to enact vulnerable worker bans, a positive development 
but one that is necessarily limited and entails relatively few legislative choices beyond setting 
the applicable income threshold. See supra Part II.B.1. California-style bans seem a less 
realistic prospect and involve even fewer legislative choices.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 146  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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that expense, particularly at the start of employment when the possibility of 
a future separation and the prospect of limited job options are not salient.147  
Employees need direct information about the law upon receiving a 
noncompete and at any point at which they might contemplate separation; in 
other words, throughout their employment.  Some proposals thus far have 
required employers to post a notice of employee rights, similar to the poster 
requirement typical of other protective employment legislation.148 The 
continued value of physical posters, however, is questionable in our 
increasingly digital age, particularly for workers in technology fields.149  In 
addition to a notice posting, state statutes should require employers to 
provide an understandable summary of the law and employees’ legal rights 
at three points in the relationship: at the time the job offer is made and prior 
to the employee accepting, at any point in the relationship when a 
noncompete or its renewal is requested of an incumbent employee, and at the 
point of termination.  The provision of information to incumbent employees 
is key to correcting the adverse effects of noncompetes on employee search 
behavior.150 
 
 147  See The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 981 (describing  
cognitive limits on new hires’ ability to evaluate the risk of signing a noncompete at the start 
of employment).  The likelihood that cognitive bias limits an individual’s ability to 
meaningfully assess boilerplate terms has been extensively explored in the consumer context.  
See, e.g., Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1203 (2003); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits 
of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); James Gibson, Vertical 
Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013).  For this and other reasons, the consensus 
among contracts scholars is that mandated disclosure is not a solution to the problem of 
adhesive consumer terms.  See, e.g.,  OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, ET AL., MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Princeton Univ. Press 2016); NANCY S. 
KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 174–210 (2013); MARGARET 
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 197–242 
(2013). There is reason to hope that advance notice will be more effective in employment 
relationships than in the consumer context.See The Rise of Delayed Terms, supra note 121, at 
661–62. My contention, however, is that it remains inadequate.   
 148  See, e.g., Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees Act, S. Res. 1504, 
114th Cong. (2015); NY Move Act, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019); S.B. 1387, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 149  See, Lobel, Enforceability TBD, supra note 31, at 892-93. This concern is one that 
goes well beyond the particular problem of noncompetes.  The need to reach employees 
through digital channels is one that has been extensively considered in the labor organizing 
context. See, e.g., Christine Neylon O’Brien, Employees on Guard: Employer Policies 
Restrict NLRA-Protected Concerted Activities on E-mail, 88 OR. L. REV. 195, 198 (2009); 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 WEST VIRGINIA L. REV. 
921, 923 (2015).  Such matters, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.  
150 Arguably the point at which this information is most needed is when an employee is 
considering whether to search for or accept alternate employment.  Since that is not a discrete 
point in the relationship, it is impossible to mandate a specifically timed disclosure that will 
address that precise concern. The hope rather is that the requirement to re-provide information 
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Of course, information campaigns, no matter how effective in 
reeducating employees, rely on employees to object to or defend against their 
employer’s unlawful contracting practices.  That is a risk many, if not most, 
might rationally decline to take.  To reduce the in terrorem effects of 
noncompetes on workers, state legislators must directly target employer 
overreach.  A simple but effective means of doing so would be to statutorily 
overrule the common judicial practice of modifying overbroad noncompetes.  
This is hardly a new idea, but it is one that demands recapitulation in light of 
the current reform movement.151  Almost every jurisdiction that enforces 
noncompetes permits a court to pare down and partially enforce a 
noncompete that is otherwise overbroad in scope.152  As a consequence of 
this practice, employers have little incentive to draft noncompetes narrowly.  
Indeed, they have every reason to overdraft, insofar as they may reap the 
benefits of the in terrorem effects of their overbroad terms during the course 
of employment.  At the same time, the employer has nothing to fear should 
the reasonableness of its noncompete ever be challenged: if a court 
ultimately concludes that the agreement is overbroad, most likely it will 
simply enforce a lesser restraint.153 
Despite this, and despite the numerous reform strategies that have 
 
upon a noncompete renewal will partially serve this purpose. Alternatively, legislators could 
consider requiring employers to provide the relevant information at regular intervals, such as 
in tandem with annual performance reviews or pay increases, irrespective of whether a 
renewal is requested.   
 151  As previously noted, both Professor Sullivan and I pointed out the perverse incentives 
created by the judicial modification rule over a decade ago.  See The Dilution of Employee 
Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 989; Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 7, at 1220; 
Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 1128–29; see also Estlund, supra  note 7, at 422-23. 
 152  Exceptions include Wisconsin, where modification is statutorily prohibited, see WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (2020); Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 505, 507 
(1984), and Virginia and Nebraska, where the question is governed by common law.  See, 
e.g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Guess and Assoc., 492 F.2d 279, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1974); Lanmark 
Tech., Inc. V. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531 (E.D. Va. 2006); Gaver v. Schneider’s O.K. 
Tire Co., 856 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1995) (“[I]t is not the function of courts to reform 
unreasonable covenants for the purpose of making them enforceable.”). For decades Georgia 
courts adhered to a relatively strict no-modification rule (sometimes referred to as the “red 
pencil” rule); however, the state legislature recently adopted a modification rule.  GA. CODE 
ANN. § 13-8-54(b) (2020). 
 153  See The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 989 (“[T]he 
availability of modification encourages employers to adopt aspirational agreements with the 
hopes of obtaining an injunction that reaches to the limits of the law.”); Estlund, supra note 
7, at 423 (“[T]he problem of [employer] overreaching . . . is exacerbated by courts’ increasing 
willingness to sever or edit offending provisions. . . [F]or the employer who seeks to impose 
the widest restrictions possible, why not take a chance and overstep the bounds of the law?”). 
In some cases, where it is clear the employer has vastly overreached, a court may decline to 
modify.  See, e.g., National Graphics Co. v. Dilley, 681 P.2d 546, 547 (Co. App. 1984) 
(affirming refusal to modify where noncopete lacked both a duration and geographic scope).  
It is unclear, however, how often courts exercise that discretion.  
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recently been proposed, there has to date been no movement towards 
eliminating judicial modification.  To the contrary, at least three recently 
adopted state statutes explicitly reaffirm courts’ ability to partially enforce 
overbroad restraints.154  This includes Massachusetts’ new noncompete law, 
arguably one of the most radically pro-employee overhauls of the new 
enforcement regime.  Others are silent on the matter, which will allow courts 
to continue their pre-reform modification practices.  This is deeply 
disappointing.  It is unclear why judicial modification has been a sleeper 
issue in the reform movement, but I strongly suspect it reflects the inevitable 
need for legislative compromise.  Those advocating for pro-employee 
reforms may be ceding this issue in their quest to achieve new substantive 
limits on noncompetes and procedural protections for workers.  While I 
understand the need for compromise, I believe the matter of judicial 
modification is too critical to trade.155 
Indeed, effective noncompete reform legislation, in addition to 
imposing penalties, must establish a comprehensive enforcement system to 
police unlawful practices and appropriately compensate aggrieved 
employees.  Such a system must account for the particular needs and 
vulnerabilities of employees at all stages of the employment relationship.  
For instance, noncompete legislation should empower and protect employees 
who challenge an employer’s use of an unlawful or overbroad agreement at 
the point at which it is requested.  This can be done by prohibiting retaliation 
against employees who question, object to, report, or attempt to negotiate a 
proposed agreement.156  On the other hand, once an employee has departed 
 
 154  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53(d) (2020) (“Any restrictive covenant not in 
compliance with the provisions of this article is unlawful and is void and unenforceable; 
provided, however, that a court may modify a covenant that is otherwise void and 
unenforceable so long as the modification does not render the covenant more restrictive with 
regard to the employee than is originally drafted by the parties.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195 
(2020) (providing that if an employer brings as action to enforce a noncompetition covenant 
that is not in compliance with the statute, “the court shall revise the covenant to the extent 
necessary and enforce the covenant as revised”); MASS. GEN. LAWS  ANN. Ch. 149 § 24L 
(2020) (“A court may, in its discretion, reform or otherwise revise a noncompetition 
agreement so as to render it valid and enforceable to the extent necessary to protect the 
applicable legitimate business interest.”). 
 155  At a minimum, any statute that maintains judicial modification must impose a 
monetary penalty on the overreaching employer.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
49.62.080 (West 2020) (“If a court or arbitrator determines that a noncompetition covenant 
violates this chapter, the violator must pay the aggrieved person the greater of his or her actual 
damages or a statutory penalty of five thousand dollars, plus reasonably attorneys’ fees, 
expenses, and costs incurred in the proceeding.”).  Such a statute deters over-drafting through 
the threat of liability while still preserving the court’s authority to modify overbroad 
agreements. 
 156  For instance, legislation recently considered in New Jersey would have prohibited an 
employer from “penaliz[ing] an employee for defending against or challenging the validity or 
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or is on the brink of defection, that employee requires access to a forum that 
will swiftly adjudicate the lawfulness of his or her agreement.157  Departing 
employees likely also need a mechanism for redressing losses resulting from 
the imposition or attempted enforcement of an unlawful or overbroad 
agreement.  This can be achieved through the creation of a private right of 
action that grants employees the right to equitable relief, actual or liquidated 
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.158  Finally, the law must create pathways 
for incumbent employees to vet their agreements ex ante.  To be sure, some 
will and should seek legal counsel before undertaking a job search.  It would 
be appropriate, however, for new legislation to entrust to a state agency the 
power to investigate noncompetes, respond to individual complaints, and 
even issue opinion letters to concerned employees.159 
 
enforceability of the covenant.” S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018).  Absent such 
a provision, at-will employees are vulnerable to adverse action should they object to an invalid 
agreement.  In theory, the common law public policy tort or state whistleblower laws could 
provide a vehicle for relief, but results in such cases have been inconsistent outside of 
California. See, e.g., Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 609 (N.J. 
2004) (holding that employee’s refusal to sign non-compete after three and a half years of 
employment was a “private dispute” over contract terms not covered by New Jersey’s 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act); Tatge v. Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 
222 (Wis. 1998) (holding that termination of an at-will employee for refusal to sign 
noncompete agreement did not give rise to wrongful discharge claim in violation of public 
policy exception). This owes in part to the reality that in an at-will employment regime, 
employers are free to fire or refuse to hire a worker who is unwilling to agree to the employer’s 
proposed terms, provided they are lawful. Noncompete reform legislation that limits the 
situations in which noncompetes can be used must simultaneously protect any employee who 
objects to an invalid agreement.  
 157  Some proposals have located authority to oversee enforcement and compliance in a 
government agency.  See, e.g., “MOVE” Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015) (granting 
U.S.Secretary of Labor authority to “receive, investigate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a 
complaint of violation”); NY Move Act, Assemb. B. 2504, 142nd Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019) (granting state labor commissioner “power to receive, investigate, attempt to resolve, 
and enforce a complaint of a violation); H.B. 563, 2019 Leg., 203rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2019) 
(granting state labor department authority to enforce law and “conduct investigations as it 
deems necessary”).  While I believe agencies can play an important role in the new 
enforcement regime, their authority must not limit departing employees’ access to an 
immediate judicial review in the face of threatened enforcement.  Indeed, it would be 
appropriate for legislation to establish an expedited pathway for employees seeking a 
declaratory judgment. 
 158  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.62.080 (2020); S.B. 2872, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. 
(N.J. 2018). 
 159  For instance, employers can seek the advice of the Department of Labor regarding 
certain compliance issues under federal employment laws, such as whether employees are 
properly classified as exempt from minimum wage and overtime under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  The opinion letters issued by the Department can serve as the basis for a good 
faith defense to liability or liquidated damages in the event of future claims.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
259 (2020).  One could imagine a similar scheme enacted through noncompete reform 
legislation that would allow an employee to obtain a determination as to the enforceability of 
his or her noncompete prior to accepting alternate employment. 
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To be sure, no legislative scheme will be perfect.  It would be a loss, 
however, if the current reform movement were to result in legislation that 
recreates the status quo or, worse, further muddies existing law.  Such is my 
fear with Massachusetts’ recent legislation that not only affirms the judicial 
modification rule, but introduces new areas of legal uncertainty while 
granting employees no vehicle for review or redress. Whatever substantive 
limitations or procedural protections new laws might impose, they will be of 
little use if employers remain free to demand overly broad noncompetes and 
credibly threaten litigation without fear of penalty or repercussion.  The 
political will necessary for meaningful reform is here; let it not be 
squandered. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Three hundred years after the seminal court decision sanctioning 
reasonable noncompetes, change is in the making.  Policy makers at all levels 
of government are considering reform initiatives that range from protections 
for vulnerable workers, to multifaceted overhauls of state law, to the outright 
elimination of all forms of employee noncompetes.  This new enforcement 
regime is being fueled in no small part by the recent wave of empirical 
research bringing to light the aggregate and individual effects of noncompete 
use.  That work, in turn, owes a debt to the foundational theoretical work 
contributed by Professor Sullivan and other legal scholars reaching back 
over decades.  The confluence of these branches of academic scholarship 
with real-time reform activity on the ground make this a critical moment for 
noncompete policy.  It is one that cannot be wasted.  A regime that wishes 
to succeed both in freeing workers from oppressive restraints and capturing 
the economic benefits associated with greater employee mobility must do 
more than merely outlaw a subclass of vulnerable worker restraints that, in 
most cases, are already void under existing law.  Employers are in a position 
to overreach relative to what state law permits, a reality with severe 
implications for all employees who sign.  Bolder statutory limitations and 
procedural requirements must be devised, attentive to the real conditions 
under which employees agree to and abide by these ancient but ubiquitous 
agreements. 
 
